The Korea Matters for Europe/Europe Matters for Korea publication maps the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the European Union’s 27 Member States. Covering a diverse range of topics including security, trade, investment, educational exchange and cultural connections, this publication highlights the importance of the Korea-EU relationship.

What is the perspective of key EU member states towards South Korea? While EU-South Korea relations have attracted growing attention in recent years, the relationship between key EU member states and the Asian country remains underexplored. This report addresses this omission by describing and analysing the recent evolution of the relationship between Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, the Netherlands, Romania and Slovakia, on the one hand, and South Korea on the other. The report covers the areas of economic relations, security relations, bilateral relations and North Korea, and cultural relations.

South Korea joined fourteen other Asia-Pacific countries in signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). By some measures, this is the biggest regional trade agreement in the world, accounting for over 30 percent of world GDP (PPP) and 30 percent of the world’s population. RCEP negotiations were formally launched in 2012, which shows that the negotiation process has not been easy. But once the agreement enters into force, it will slash tariffs and unify rules of origin – thus strengthening Asia-Pacific economic integration. The expectation is that South Korea and Japan, the two largest exporters of high-tech goods in the region, will be among the major beneficiaries of the agreement.

President Moon Jae-in has welcomed incoming president Joe Biden by reiterating the value of the ROK-US alliance. What kind of South Korea will Biden be facing? For many years, South Korea has been able to implement a more or less autonomous foreign policy. Facing constraints, yes. But also putting South Korean interests first. It is a South Korea that is more independent and confident in its foreign policy goals and sees a strong alliance with the United States as a crucial component of its foreign policy. For many South Korean policy-makers, their country’s rise as a regional power – and, increasingly, as a more important player in global affairs – has been facilitated rather than constrained by the ROK-US alliance. It is also a South Korea that will be willing to support US initiatives aimed at checking China’s rise – as long as they don’t openly challenge Beijing.

At the time of writing, US voters seem to have spoken and Joe Biden will emerge as the winner of the 2020 US presidential election. Most reliable media have declared Biden the winner of the election based on votes counted and the electoral votes allocated accordingly. Even though it seems that Donald Trump will litigate the results and will try to have them overturned, other countries will have to operate under the assumption that Biden will become the new US president come January. In the case of South Korea, we can expect the Moon Jae-in government to have an overall positive view of the change in president. In the case of North Korea, its position towards the new president would be less clear.

If South Korea could cast a vote in the US presidential election, who would it support? From President Moon Jae-in’s perspective, three issues promise to be particularly relevant for the US-ROK relationship going forward: Credible deterrence against a potential North Korean aggression, the process of inter-Korean reconciliation and the evolution of Sino-American rivalry in East Asia. Attempts to forecast Donald Trump and Joe Biden’s respective Korean strategies in too much detail should surely be taken with a grain of salt. But the candidates’ track record and campaign rhetoric can still serve as a useful starting point for predicting some of the broader contours in this regard. Overall, a Biden presidency is Seoul’s safest bet. Friction will continue between the two countries, and North Korea remains a major wild card. Nonetheless, if Biden wins, expect the Blue House to breathe a sigh of relief.

This report sets out to analyse South Korea’s positioning in non-traditional security. Since the end of the Cold War, non-traditional threats have become more central to the national security of countries everywhere across the world. South Korea is no exception. This report helps to address this imbalance in our understanding of threats to South Korean national security. It analyses non-traditional security by focusing on four key domains: cyber, energy, maritime and trade.

The US campaign against Huawei has brought to the fore questions about secure 5G equipment procurement, at the time when intensive 5G network deployment is planned across Europe. The EU has accelerated its work on 5G & cyber policies and has published a “toolbox” to identify high-risk vendors. While Europe rethinks its relationship with China and its stance on the campaign, others are turning towards trusted suppliers such as South Korea’s Samsung Electronics which has recently obtained 5G equipment supply contracts with several countries. South Korea and the EU are navigating an increasingly competitive landscape with economic and diplomatic pitfalls, as well as opportunities. As they face growing and divisive pressures from the US and China, the EU and South Korea are committing to multilateralism.

On 14 September, Suga Yoshihide, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, was elected as the new president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to serve the remainder of Abe Shinzo’s term through September 2021. The party’s control of the lower house means that Suga is now set to become prime minister, succeeding Abe, who is the longest serving premier in Japanese history. For Korea-Japan relations, there are reasons to believe that the leadership change is likely to have a more positive effect than a negative one.

South Korea has found itself in a difficult position after the US’ announcement of an ‘United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China.’ South Korea has cultivated deep economic interests tied to China, and obtained security guarantees through its alliance with the US. For the benefit of these interests, South Korea has kept a strategic ambiguity about China’s controversial issues, but the US’ announcement could push South Korea to change its strategic position which may risk its security and economic interests. In an environment of intensifying hegemonic rivalry, sandwiched between the US and China, it needs to think about a more clear stance. This includes expressing understanding towards US’ grievances with China’s economic activities and voicing issues related to security and values, like democracy and human rights.