The US campaign against Huawei has brought to the fore questions about secure 5G equipment procurement, at the time when intensive 5G network deployment is planned across Europe. While Europe rethinks its relationship with China and its stance on the campaign, others are turning towards trusted suppliers such as South Korea which has recently obtained 5G equipment supply contracts with the US, Canada and New Zealand. As Samsung Electronics expands its presence in the market, more collaboration is expected with European operators as Chinese competitors are hit with restrictions. The EU has accelerated its work on 5G & cyber policies and has published earlier this year a “toolbox” to identify high-risk vendors. The EU and South Korea are navigating a deeply competitive landscape with economic and diplomatic pitfalls, as they seek to establish digital leadership through international cooperation.

On 14 September, Suga Yoshihide, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary, was elected as the new president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to serve the remainder of Abe Shinzo’s term through September 2021. The party’s control of the lower house means that Suga is now set to become prime minister, succeeding Abe, who is the longest serving premier in Japanese history. For Korea-Japan relations, there are reasons to believe that the leadership change is likely to have a more positive effect than a negative one.

South Korea has found itself in a difficult position after the US’ announcement of an ‘United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China.’ South Korea has cultivated deep economic interests tied to China, and obtained security guarantees through its alliance with the US. For the benefit of these interests, South Korea has kept a strategic ambiguity about China’s controversial issues, but the US’ announcement could push South Korea to change its strategic position which may risk its security and economic interests. In an environment of intensifying hegemonic rivalry, sandwiched between the US and China, it needs to think about a more clear stance. This includes expressing understanding towards US’ grievances with China’s economic activities and voicing issues related to security and values, like democracy and human rights.

A decade of a special relationship – the EU only maintains ten strategic partnerships worldwide. As we reach the ten-year point with Korea, now is the moment, not to look back but to look forward and act. The pressing circumstances of great power rivalry, particularly in Asia, and the global onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic leave us no time to indulge in congratulatory speeches. A partnership of choice allows us to work together as normative powers to ensure a sustainable, comprehensive and rules-based connectivity, to improve the implementation of human rights, to fight climate change in deeds not words, and to strengthen international law and international governance, as well as the United Nations system. The post-COVID economic recovery and the transition to a sustainable, socially just, resilient and climate neutral economy should be achieved together.

South Korea and the EU held a video conference meeting involving South Korean president Moon Jae-in, European Council president Charles Michel and European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen. The meeting was held to highlight the importance of the bilateral relationship as both sides celebrate the tenth anniversary of their strategic partnership. It will be followed by their tenth bilateral summit, to be held in Seoul as soon as conditions allow. The meeting was seen by both sides as a way to move towards making practical cooperation materialise.

At the height of global recognition for its handling of COVID-19, the Moon Jae-in administration is looking ahead with its New Deal plan, being touted as an innovative economic recovery plan, allocating around USD 63 billion till 2025. The plan is split into two pillars, the Digital and Green New Deal. The former focuses on the future through investments in the areas of 5G wireless communication and AI, while bringing the rest of South Korea up to speed in digitalisation.

In recent weeks, North Korea has manufactured a crisis with South Korea. Pyongyang’s words and actions strongly suggest that it would have found any reason to start a crisis in the Korean Peninsula, regardless of Seoul’s response. At the time of writing, North Korea is essentially tearing up the Panmunjom Declaration that both Koreas signed in 2018, including its implementation agreement in the military domain. In short Pyongyang is symbolising that the period of inter-Korean rapprochement launched two years ago is over for the time being.

South Korea has been successful in the containment and management of the spread of the first wave of COVID-19. An early surge in the number of cases in Daegu briefly made South Korea the country with the second largest number of cases back in February. Five months since news of the COVID-19 pandemic emerged from China in late December 2019, however, South Korea is widely seen as a model for dealing with this crisis. To a large extent, this is due to the country’s preparedness to deal with pandemics. Since the MERS outbreak of 2015, and also the MS Sewol ferry disaster one year earlier, the South Korean state has developed the necessary capacities to prepare for pandemics.

While countries in the West have suffered from domestic struggles, the global crisis caused by COVID-19 has become an opportunity for public diplomacy for several countries in the East. Once having the second largest outbreak in the world behind China, South Korea succeeded in flattening the curve quickly thanks to swift government intervention and joined the soft power race immediately. However, the initiative was purposefully connected to public diplomacy at home with the aim of winning the 21st legislative election. Promoted as “South Korea’s corona-diplomacy” by government campaigns, the victory against the novel coronavirus narrative was deliberately employed to get domestic consensus behind approving the Moon administration, whose strategy achieved its objective.

President Moon Jae-in gave a speech on May 10th, on the occasion of the third anniversary since his inauguration. With two years in his non-renewable five-year presidency to go and South Korea recovering from the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, Moon sought to set his government’s priorities for a post-pandemic world. Inevitably, the address was dominated by South Korea’s response to the economic consequences of the pandemic. But Moon also referred to how his government plans to make use of the international ramifications of the pandemic to press its foreign policy agenda.